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INTRODUCTION 
The use of acquitted conduct at sentencing is a highly contentious 
practice in sentencing theory, policy and practice.  This Article 
provides a critical analysis of acquitted conduct sentencing under the 
relevant conduct provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”) by tracing the constitutional and statutory arguments 
within the conceptual framework governing current sentencing 
practices in the United States.  In federal court and many state courts1 
across the United States, once a defendant is convicted, judges are 
permitted to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on relevant conduct, 
of which he was acquitted of at trial, if the alleged conduct can be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing 
hearing.2 
The 2007 case of Robert Mercado in California offers a useful 
example.3  Mercado was charged, tried by a jury, and subsequently 
 1. Enag Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at 
Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2009) (surveying state cases) (citing Kevin R. 
Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 528 
(1993) (noting that “[n]early every state allows sentencing courts to engage freely in real-
offense sentencing as a matter of discretion.”)); but see Danielle M. Hansen, The Absentee 
Post-Conviction Constitutional Safeguards, 28 TOURO L. REV. 563, 599 (2012) (noting that 
the First and Second Departments within New York State’s Appellate Division prohibit a 
sentencing judge from considering acquitted conduct). 
 2. Megan Sterback, Getting Time for an Acquitted Crime: The Unconstitutional Use 
of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and New York’s Call for Change, 26 TOURO L. REV. 
1223, 1224–25 (2011) (internal citations omitted). See also Ngov, supra note 1, at 236–37 
n.11; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (2012). 
 3. James J. Bilsborrow, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49 
WM. MARY L. REV. 289, 290 (2007) (citing United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 655, 
658–59 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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convicted on various counts of drug conspiracy.4  Additionally, 
Mercado was charged and acquitted of participation in three murders, 
the commission of violent crimes in the aid of racketeering, and assault 
with a deadly weapon.5  Based upon his drug convictions, the 
Guidelines recommended a punishment of thirty to thirty-seven 
months’ imprisonment.6  Yet at Mercado’s sentencing, the sentencing 
judge set aside the jury’s acquittals and considered the acquitted 
conduct per the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines and 
imposed a sentence of twenty-years, increasing the punishment 
recommended by the Guidelines—and the jury verdict—by over 
seventeen years.7 
The term ‘acquitted conduct sentencing’ considers “acts for which 
the offender was criminally charged and formally adjudicated not 
guilty at trial”8 and is exercised where there is “any reliance on such 
acts by the sentencing judge as a basis for enhancing an offender’s 
sentence.”9  Acquitted conduct—which is characterized as ‘relevant 
conduct’ under the United States Sentencing Guideline regime—
encompasses both criminal conduct alleged to have occurred 
contemporaneously with the charges of conviction and alleged prior 
criminal conduct.10 
The hallmark of the American judicial process is the right to trial 
by jury11 and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
sustain a conviction.12  The significance of this protection can be 
gleaned from its historical recognition as an “unassailable right” dating 
back to at least the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.13  The system 
 4. Mercado, 474 F.3d at 655. 
 5. Id. at 658–59. 
 6. Id. at 659. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—Abolishing the Use of Acquitted 
Conduct in Guideline Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 157–58 (1996) (providing definition 
of acquitted conduct). 
 9. Id. at 157. 
 10. Id.  See also Sterback, supra note 2, at 1230 (“While the pre-Guidelines approach 
allowed a judge to use unlimited discretion in sentencing, the Guidelines only allow the 
judge to consider factors of relevant conduct.”) (emphasis added).  This definition of 
acquitted conduct sentencing is adopted throughout this Article and, except where noted 
otherwise, is used in tandem with the term “relevant conduct” since relevant conduct 
includes acquitted conduct. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See also Robert Alan 
Semones, A Parade of Horribles: Uncharged Relevant Conduct, the Federal Prosecutorial 
Loophole, Tails Wagging Dogs in Federal Sentencing Law, and United States v. Fitch, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 315 (2013) (“One of the most impressive American judicial 
processes is the trial by jury.”). 
 12. Sterback, supra note 2, at 1225 (citations omitted). 
 13. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–54 (1968) (detailing the fundamental 
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of jury fact-finding in colonial times was developed from the English 
system of criminal law,14 where criminal proceedings were submitted 
to a jury after being initiated by an indictment containing “all the facts 
and circumstances which constitute the offence . . . stated with such 
certainty and precision, that the defendant 
 . . . may be enabled to determine the species of offence they constitute, 
in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly . . . and that there 
may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the 
defendant be convicted.”15  When Blackstone published his treatise in 
the 1760s, the English speaking people had enjoyed the right of trial by 
jury in criminal cases for more than 500 years, and common law 
lawyers and judges, from Bracton in 1250 to Lord Coke in 1620 to 
Blackstone,16 had come to “revere their unique institution of liberty.”17  
The fundamental role of the jury in the criminal arena played a vital 
role in the founding of the United States and is enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution, Article III, §2 and its Sixth Amendment.18 
Notwithstanding the historical origins of the jury, why is the use 
of acquitted conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence worth 
considering?  The issue is important for three reasons.  First, the use of 
acquitted conduct sentencing implicates the justifications for 
punishment by the state.  Contemporary sentencing practices in the 
United States have made increasing use of imprisonment and have 
placed greater restrictions on non-custodial sentences.19  Thus, the 
right to a jury trial in the criminal context and the historical record of its origin in common-
law England).  
 14. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II:  THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATION ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 226–28, 306–29 (2003) 
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368–82).   
 15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2000). See JOHN FREDERICK 
ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 72 (John Jervis et 
al. eds., 23 ed. 1905); JOHN PRENTISS BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: OR, 
PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 80 (2d ed. 1872).  
 16. See United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 388–97 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(Merritt, J., dissenting).  
 17. Id. at 393 (quoting 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 386–87 
(George E. Woodbine ed., 1968)). 
 18. See THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A SOURCEBOOK 
AND GUIDE TO THE IDEAS, TERMS, AND VOCABULARY USED BY THE FRAMERS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 860–67 (Stuart B. Flexner et al. eds., 1991); Bilsborrow, 
supra note 3, at 294–95.  
 19. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 71–74 (5th ed. 2010) 
(distinguishing aims of the criminal justice system from the justifications of punishment).  
See also Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST 
(July 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node 
/16636027 (noting that as of 2010 there were between 2.3 and 2.4 million Americans behind 
bars in the U.S). 
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imposition of state sanctioned punishment requires justification not 
only to counter the proposition that “anyone who commits any offence 
forfeits all rights, and may be dealt with by the state in whatever 
manner the courts decree,”20 but also to preserve the communicative 
value of punishment.  Second, the use of acquitted conduct at 
sentencing undermines the foundational principle of the American 
criminal justice system: “[T]hat it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”21  Third, the practical 
consequences of acquitted conduct sentencing has resulted in dramatic 
increases in the length of defendants’ sentences—sometimes resulting 
in life imprisonment22—and has been criticized as “Kafka-esque,”23 
“repugnant,”24 “uniquely malevolent,”25 and “pernicious,”26 leading 
one juror to openly complain to the judge having read news accounts 
depicting the jury’s verdict having been ignored at sentencing.27 
This Article argues that use of acquitted conduct at sentencing 
should be prohibited on both constitutional and normative grounds.  To 
substantiate this claim, four particular aspects are explored: First, why 
is acquitted conduct considered relevant at sentencing?  Second, what 
is the prevailing conceptual framework, if any, that underpins the 
 20. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74. 
 21. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 22. See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1995) (“At sentencing, 
under the Guidelines, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Lombard had used his illegally possessed firearm to commit “another offense”: the same 
murders of which he had been acquitted in the state court.  The resulting Guidelines 
sentence was a mandatory term of life in prison, which Maine law would not have required 
even had defendant been convicted of the murders. Lombard thus received a life sentence 
based on the federal court's finding that it was more likely than not that Lombard had 
committed the murders of which he had been acquitted.”).  
 23. Ngov, supra note 1, at 298; Farnaz Farkish, Docking the Tail that Wags the Dog: 
Why Congress Should Abolish the Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and How Courts 
Should Treat Acquitted Conduct After United States v. Booker, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 101, 
101 (2007); Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 290 n.8; United States v. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 
532, 536 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2006) (comparing consideration of acquitted conduct to the fictional 
use of “non-final acquittals” in Kafka’s The Trial, which permitted an accused to be 
acquitted but allowed him to potentially be re-arrested at a later time for the same particular 
offense) (citations omitted). 
 24. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 169–70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Eric 
Tirschwell & Michael Eisenkraft, “Repugnant” and “Malevolent”: The Use of Acquitted 
Conduct in Federal Sentencing, N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009).   
 25. United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776–77 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
 26. United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bright, J., 
concurring). 
 27. Jim McElhatton, ‘Juror No. 6’ Stirs Debate on Sentencing, WASH. TIMES (May 3, 
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/3/juror-no-6-questions-rules-of-
sentencing/?page=all.  
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American system of punishment, and moreover, where and how does 
the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing fit in the current prevailing 
sentencing ideology in the United States?  Third, what are the issues 
and consequences emanating from the use of acquitted conduct under 
the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines?  Fourth and finally, 
while it is outside the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive 
solution or alternative to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing, the 
key observation is that, since the common thread linking the 
constitutional and normative issues emanates from the fragmented 
nature of sentencing policy in the United States, the solution must start 
with re-conceptualizing the theories underlying sentencing. 
A comprehensive analysis of acquitted conduct sentencing 
requires contextualizing the historical evolution of sentencing, penal 
policy, and the constitutional limitations on punishment.  Part I begins 
with some preliminary issues, briefly recapitulating the development of 
modern sentencing philosophy which gave rise to the use of acquitted 
conduct at sentencing.  In Part II the fragmented and muddled nature of 
the prevailing conceptual framework, which underpins contemporary 
sentencing policy, is set out as a basis for Part III’s examination of the 
consequences of acquitted conduct sentencing.  Finally, Part IV offers a 
conclusion and notes that the response to the problems arising from 
acquitted conduct sentencing must start with a re-conceptualization of 
sentencing itself to reflect a primary rationale or model. 
I. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING VERSUS DETERMINATE SENTENCING 
UNDER THE GUIDELINES 
The debate over determinate sentencing versus indeterminate 
sentencing has been characterized as a debate between proponents of 
the so-called medical or treatment model of corrections and those who 
favor the punitive model.28  The Model Penal Code, an influential piece 
of draft legislation written during the early 1960s by the American Law 
Institute, clearly shows the significance of rehabilitative aims at the 
time: Courts were not to sentence offenders to imprisonment if, 
amongst other things, “the defendant is particularly likely to respond 
affirmatively to probationary treatment.”29  While the 1960s are often 
regarded as the “heyday of rehabilitationism,”30 and the 1970s as the 
 28. See WILLIAM TAYLOR & MICHAEL BRASWELL, ISSUES IN POLICE AND CRIMINAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 19–21 (1978). 
 29. Francis A. Allen, Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 1 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (quoting MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 7.01(2)(j), (k) (1962)). 
 30. Id (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (1962)). 
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beginning of a “catastrophic decline” of the rehabilitative ideal, the 
rehabilitative aims or goals of imprisonment have nevertheless 
remained part of penal practice and penal theory to this day.31 
However, before turning to a discussion of the historical evolution 
and shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing, it is important 
to address the logically antecedent question of why the state has a right 
to punish in the first place.  Similarly, what are the aims and purposes 
of punishment imposed by the state and why do they matter?  While 
there are multiple justifications for state punishment, these 
justifications are intertwined with the purpose and meaning of 
punishment.  The common thread that relates the problems of the 
indeterminate and determinate sentencing eras is the disruption to the 
justifications, purposes and meanings of punishment by the state. 
Towards this end, Part I.A. provides an outline for justifications of 
punishment by the state. Part I.B. provides a brief sketch of the various 
aims and purposes of punishment.  Part I.C. discusses the foundational 
basis for indeterminate sentencing and explores the role of judicial fact 
finding during that period.  This Section also identifies the problems 
that arose during the indeterminate sentencing regime leading to 
significant reforms in 1980s.  Part I.D. presents the shift to determinate 
sentencing.  Part I.E. outlines the structural and legal framework for 
consideration of acquitted conduct under the Guidelines’ relevant 
conduct provisions. 
A. Justifications for Punishment by the State 
Criminal punishment is not merely the imposition of pain allowed 
by the law.32  It is the most powerful and the most widely used device 
that the law has at its disposal.33  It is also the “crudest and most 
frightening” device at the law’s disposal.34  Why does the state have a 
right to punish?  In a related vein, when does the state acquire its right 
to punish?  These questions implicate social contract theories,35 or 
more pragmatically, the state’s role in carrying out a displacement 
function that is essential to social co-operation.36  “The justification of 
 31. Id. 
 32. HYMAN GROSS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A CONCISE MORAL CRITIQUE 9 
(2012).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74–75; Neil MacCormick & David Garland, 
Sovereign States and Vengeful Victims: The Problem of the Right to Punish, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 18–20 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 
1998). 
 36. See id. 
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punishment tout court is surrounded by satellite questions of 
justification that are of great importance in their own right”:37 Are we 
justified in making some particular item of conduct punishable?38  By 
what standard are we to attach criminal liability?39 
Then there is the question of what sentences to prescribe for those 
crimes.40  Given the huge and complex debate surrounding these 
issues, they cannot be dealt with in-depth and are outside the scope of 
this Section.  Suffice it to say that the importance of punishment being 
in the hands of state institutions rather than victims or other individuals 
resides both in a mixture of rule-of-law values and the need for the 
state to ensure peaceable cooperation.41  Though many other important 
issues are involved in resolving these questions of justification, a 
settled view of what makes punishment right is essential.  The most 
basic requirement for liability to criminal punishment is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all the elements of the offence, as well as all 
factors that increase the range of penal sanctions.42 
As noted by Justice Brennan:43 
[t]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital 
role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.  The accused 
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest[s] of immense 
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his 
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would 
be stigmatized by the conviction.  Accordingly, a society that 
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not 
condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is 
reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . There is always, in litigation, a 
margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both 
parties must take into account.  Where one party has at stake an 
interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his 
liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of 
placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the fact-
finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty 
unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the 
fact-finder of his guilt.44 
The “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement is a 
 37. GROSS, supra note 32, at 8. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 9–10. 
 40. See id. 
 41. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74–75. 
 42. GROSS, supra note 32, at 9. 
 43. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).  
 44. Id. at 363–64, cited in GROSS, supra note 32, at 9.  
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foundational principle of American criminal justice and traces its roots 
to Blackstone’s eighteenth century principle that “it is better that ten 
guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.”45 
B. Aims and Purposes of Punishment 
Throughout history, several explanations have been used to 
explain the aims and purposes of punishment.46  A citizen may 
demand:  
[f]irst, get them off the streets; keep them away from us.  Make 
them suffer: they deserve it.  Teach them a lesson they will not 
forget.  And let their pain and sufferings be an example to others.  
Maybe then, having been punished, someday, somehow, these 
criminals will feel remorse, change their attitudes, and 
productively reintegrate into society.47 
Drawing upon concepts and perspectives implicit in the Bible and 
the works of, amongst others, Plato, Hobbes, Beccaria, Kant, Bentham, 
and numerous contemporary commentators,48 legal scholars have 
explained the aims of punishment as “reinforcement of sovereign 
authority,”49 “incapacitation,”50 “retribution,”51 “deterrence,”52 and  
“rehabilitation.”53  While each of these aims suggests a distinct 
normative foundation for punishment used to justify various strategies 
of response to criminal behavior, they all reflect one common 
justification: punishment is communicative.54  Punishment 
communicates to the offender the censure or condemnation that they 
deserve for their crimes.55  Therefore, the formal criminal sanction 
 45. Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and 
Corrections Act,  72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1566 (1981) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27). 
 46. Elizabeth E. Joh, “If it Suffices to Accuse”: United States v. Watts and the 
Reassessment of Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 887 (1999). 
 47. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of 
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1990) (citations omitted).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Joh, supra note 46, at 887 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 48 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977)). 
 50. A.E. Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Incapacitation and “Vivid Danger”, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 83–84. 
 51. R.A. Duff, Punishment, Retribution and Communication, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 126–27. 
 52. Jeremy Bentham, Punishment and Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: 
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 53–56.  
 53. Allen, supra note 29, at 1–10.  See also ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 71–74 
(distinguishing aims of the criminal justice system from the justifications of punishment). 
 54. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 90 (citations omitted); Joh, supra note 46, at 887–88. 
 55. Id. 
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imposed through sentencing is “not simply the governmental apparatus 
that responds to crime and criminals,”56 but also “plays a powerful 
teaching function,”57 which reflects the “dominant social themes of the 
moment.”58 
C. Indeterminate Sentencing 
1. Indeterminate Sentencing and Judicial Fact Finding 
The original Model Penal Code’s embrace of rehabilitation as a 
main penal purpose represented an early twentieth-century view that 
rehabilitation was morally and scientifically superior to retribution in 
criminal sentencing.59  The rehabilitative ideal—that sentences should 
seek to reform the criminal tendencies of offenders—was tied to a 
specific setting for treatment growing out of developments in clinical 
psychology.60  As such, an indeterminate sentencing regime took 
hold.61  In this period of indeterminate sentencing, each offender’s 
unique characteristics were taken into account through individualized 
sentencing, thereby, emphasizing the rehabilitative goal of sentences.62  
The judge’s role under this regime was therapeutic, likened to a 
physician: crime was a “moral disease,” whose cure was entrusted to 
experts in the criminal justice field, one of whom was the judge.63  As a 
consequence, different standards of proof and evidence evolved 
between the trial stage,64 which required proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt,65 and the sentencing stage,66 which only required proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.67  The rationale for this approach was 
straightforward: to limit the kind of information that a judge should get 
at sentencing would prohibit them from exercising their “clinical” 
 56. Joh, supra note 46, at 887. 
 57. Id. at 902 (citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 888. 
 59. Sarah Armstrong, Bureaucracy, Private Prisons, and the Future of Penal Reform, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 280 (2003) (citing Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The 
Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2000)); Allen, supra note 
29, at 1. 
 60. Armstrong, supra note 59, at 280. 
 61. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much 
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010) (tracing the roots of 
indeterminate sentencing).   
 62. Donald W. Dowd, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War 
Against Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REV. 301, 302 (1995).  See Allen, supra note 29, at 1–5. 
 63. Gertner, supra note 61, at 695 (citations omitted).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
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role.68 
In 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionally approved this 
philosophical and procedural approach in Williams v. New York.69  The 
Williams court emphasized that “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence”70 
and, thus, having the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s previous life and characteristics was essential for 
“sentencing experts” to exercise their discretion.71  For the Williams 
Court, the rehabilitative ideal not only justified entrusting judges and 
parole officials with enormous sentencing discretion, but also called for 
sentencing judges and, by extension, parole officers, to be “freed from 
any procedural rules that might limit the sound exercise of their 
discretion.”72  In 1970, Congress codified Williams in 18 U.S.C. § 
3577.  Congress provided a statutory footing for the discretionary 
consideration of relevant conduct, which includes both past and 
contemporaneous acquitted conduct, as well as un-adjudicated conduct 
at sentencing.73 
2. Problems With Indeterminate Sentencing 
During the indeterminate sentencing era, judges and parole 
authorities had the most power relative to other “sentencing players.”74  
Each case was resolved on its own merits; any standards or rules 
evolved from the day-to-day experience of individual judges and 
confined to his courtroom.75  However, there were several problems 
with indeterminate sentencing, which sowed the seeds of an 
institutional shakeup.76  Judges had no training in how to exercise their 
considerable discretion.77  Sentencing was not taught in law schools; 
concepts such as deterrence and rehabilitation were not reflected in 
 68. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1941).  See generally Reitz, supra 
note 1, at 528–30 (providing a full discussion of the facts of Williams). 
 69. Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1, 4. 
 70. Id. at 4–5. 
 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Erica K. Beutler, A Look at the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Sentencing, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 809, 814 (1998).  Section 3577 was re-codified to 18 U.S.C. § 
3661 after the sentencing reforms of the 1980s.  See infra Part I.D. 
 74. Gertner, supra note 61, at 696. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  See Berman, supra note 69, at 8 & n.41.  See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, 
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 3–34, 59–123 (1976) (discussing the 
failures of the rehabilitative model); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162–82 
(1975) (exploring the failings of the rehabilitative model). 
 77. Gertner, supra note 61, at 696–97.  
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judicial training.78  Next, wide disparity in sentencing among both 
offenders and offences was the norm, leading the chief proponent of 
structured sentencing to describe this period as “unruly,” “arbitrary” 
and “discriminatory.”79  Thus, so long as the federal substantive law 
was composed of “overlapping categories and muddled distinctions 
among offenses,”80 federal sentencing was bound to seem “lawless.”81 
Beginning in the 1970s, the assumptions behind the consensus on 
individualized sentencing with its rehabilitative goal were under attack 
from all sides.82  From the left, there was a growing mistrust of the 
“therapeutic state.”83  From the right, critics called for more and more 
mandatory sentences to punish and deter; exercising any discretion was 
considered, at best, a weak, Bennite solution.84  Retribution was 
advocated not as revenge, but as “just deserts.”85  Nearly twenty-five 
years after the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal and the 
implementation of a just deserts model of punishment, mass 
incarceration for significant periods of time appears to be the common 
theme in the United States. Justice is harsher in the United States than 
in any other developed country.86  As of 2010, there were between 2.3 
and 2.4 million Americans behind bars;87 including parole, probation or 
supervised release, one adult in thirty-one is under “correctional” 
supervision in the United States.88  And perhaps more troubling, the 
United States has the highest rate of prisoners (748) while Iceland (55) 
had the lowest.89 
D. Determinate Sentencing Under the Guidelines: Structure and 
Application 
Driven by the concerns with indeterminate sentencing, Congress 
 78. Id. (citing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1998)). 
 79. Id. at 697 (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER 49 (1972)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (citing Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 195, 202 (1997)).  
 82. Dowd, supra note 62, at 302. 
 83. NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCE 
THERAPY (1971). 
 84. Dowd, supra note 62, at 303. 
 85. Id. at 303.  See Allen, supra note 29, at 29.  
 86. Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST 
(July 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16636027.  
 87. Id.  Note that this figure includes both state and federal prisoners. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).90  In an attempt to 
address the unpredictability of sentencing, the SRA created the United 
States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to provide “certainty and 
fairness in [congruence with] the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .”91  
Towards this end, the SRA attempted to introduce standardization, 
precision, and impartiality into federal sentencing decisions by 
establishing Guideline for sentencing.92  Parole, a hallmark of the 
rehabilitative model, was also abolished.93 
The centerpiece of the Guidelines was a grid containing 258 
cells.94  The Guideline grid’s vertical axis consists of forty-three 
offense levels, reflecting a base severity score for the crime 
committed.95  The Guideline grid’s horizontal axis consists of six 
criminal history categories and provides adjustments based on the 
offender’s past conviction record.96  After a plea of guilt or conviction 
at trial, a pre-sentence investigation is conducted by a probation officer 
and a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) is submitted to the Court to enable 
the judge to “meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority” under 
§3553 of the SRA.”97  The PSR provides a preliminary mathematical 
calculation of both the “offense level” and “criminal history.”98  In 
determining the defendant’s offense level, the PSR guideline 
calculation reflects the base offense guideline level corresponding to 
the defendant’s conviction or the relevant conduct underlying the 
conviction, whichever is higher, and then adjusts the offense level for 
specific offense characteristics and special instructions contained in the 
 90. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–3586 (2000), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000)); Joh, 
supra note 46, at 892–93 (“In particular, the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
responded to critiques of indeterminate sentencing with an attempt to introduce 
standardization, precision, and impartiality into federal sentencing decisions.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 91. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE 
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 11 (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/08-26221.pdf.   
 92. Joh, supra note 46, at 892. 
 93. Id. at 893. 
 94. Sherod Thaxton, Determining “Reasonableness Without A Reason”? Federal 
Appellate Review Post-Rita v United States, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1885, 1887 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(c). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d). 
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section.99  After determining the offense level, the PSR determines the 
defendant’s criminal history category.100  The PSR then identifies the 
cell at which the factors intersect; the corresponding cell provides the 
recommended range within which the judge may sentence a defendant 
(the “Guideline Sentencing Range”).101  However, prior to sentencing 
of the defendant, both the Government and the Defendant may file their 
objections to the calculations or factual statements in the PSR.102  At 
sentencing, the sentencing judge resolves any disputes or 
disagreements based on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
and imposes a sentence.103 
E. Structural Framework for Acquitted Conduct Under the Guidelines’ 
 Relevant Conduct Provisions 
1. Modified Real-Offense System 
In developing the Guidelines, the Commission adopted a 
“modified real-offense” system, which “blends the constraints of the 
offense of conviction” with “the reality of the defendant’s actual 
offense conduct in order to gauge the seriousness of that conduct for 
sentencing purposes.”104  This modified real offense system is premised 
on the consideration of all relevant conduct, regardless of the jury 
verdict and regardless of whether the relevant conduct was amongst the 
charged offences.105  For instance, a defendant who is charged and 
convicted of fraud and money laundering offences may, without further 
charge or conviction, be sentenced using the base Guideline offence 
level for pre-meditated murder if the court finds by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a murder had taken place.106  Similarly, a defendant 
who is charged with drug and firearm offences, but acquitted of the 
firearm offence may, nevertheless, be sentenced using the base 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(f). 
 103. See Thaxton, supra note 94, at 1887–88. 
 104. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 497 (1990).  
 105. See, e.g., Criminal Law-Federal Sentencing-Ninth Circuit Affirms 262-Month 
Sentence Based on Uncharged Murder, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1860, 1861–62 (2012).  For a 
thorough, yet not entirely convincing defense of the ‘modified real offense’ system, see Julie 
R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997). 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Fitch, 659 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 2011) (providing an 
example of this factual scenario), discussed in Semones, supra note 11. 
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Guideline offence level for firearm related offences.107  The 
consideration of “real conduct” at sentencing operates through the 
relevant conduct provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guideline 
Manual108 and the “no limitation” language of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which 
provides that there shall be no limitation placed on the type of 
information the Court may consider at sentencing.109 
Acquitted conduct sentencing continued after the enactment of the 
Guidelines for four reasons.  First, as discussed in Part II infra, the 
SRA fails to conceptualize any coherent sentencing theory.  The SRA 
simply made the application of the Guidelines mandatory without any 
guidance to judges on how the various purposes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) were incorporated into the relevant Guideline ranges.  Second, 
the holdings of Williams, discussed above, were re-codified by 
Congress with the exact same language as before with the passage of 
the SRA without any regard to the new philosophy rooted in retribution 
and incapacitation.110 
Third, a mere two years after the SRA and the shift in penal 
philosophy on the federal level, the Supreme Court decided McMillan 
v. Pennsylvania,111 originally a state court case, which coined the term 
“sentencing factor.”112  Per McMillan, a “sentencing factor” is a fact 
not found by a jury, but found by a judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence at sentencing, which affects the sentencing range.113  In 
McMillan, the Court rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge concluding 
that a sentencing factor does not constitute additional punishment; it 
merely limits a judge’s sentencing discretion.114 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (providing an 
example of this factual scenario). 
 108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3–.4 (2012). 
 109. Sterback, supra note 2, at 1232–33; Gerald Leonard & Christine Dieter, 
Punishment Without Conviction: Controlling the Use of Unconvicted Conduct in Federal 
Sentencing, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 260, 273–74 (2012) (citation omitted).  See Berman, 
supra note 69, at 17–23. 
 110. Beutler, supra note 73, at 827–28; 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012). 
 111. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).  For federal counterpart see Harris 
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).  
 112. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154 (2013).  
 113. Id.  
 114. 477 U.S. 79.  In McMillan, a Pennsylvania state court convicted the defendants of 
various felonies covered by the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act.  Id. at 
82.  The Act provided in relevant part that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies 
is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing 
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant “visibly possessed a 
firearm” during the commission of the felony.  PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).  Following 
the defendants’ conviction, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave notice that it would 
proceed under the Act at sentencing; however, the sentencing judges found the Act 
unconstitutional and imposed lesser sentences than those required by the statute.  McMillan, 
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McMillan was delivered in the midst of a complex and ever-
changing due process analysis and represented the Supreme Court’s 
broader effort to limit the scope of its decisions in In re Winship and 
Mullaney v. Wilbur115 and, consequently, the applicability of the due 
process clause to the criminal law.116  In In re Winship, the Supreme 
Court decided that the due process clause required “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which [the defendant] is charged”117 in an adjudication to determine 
juvenile delinquency.118  In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the reasonable doubt standard applied to all factors that, 
if present, could affect the defendant’s interests in liberty and 
reputation.119  However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided in 
Patterson v. New York120 to limit the rule of In re Winship only to those 
factors defined by statute as elements of a crime.  Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for a plurality of the Court in McMillan, stated that its holding 
was “controlled by Patterson . . . rather than by Mullaney”121 and 
justified increasing severity in punishment through a “convenient yet 
dangerous fiction . . . of the punishment-enhancement distinction.”122 
Fourth, after the Guidelines came into force, the Supreme Court 
re-affirmed the principles of Williams in United States v. Watts and 
rejected a double jeopardy challenge123 against the use of acquitted 
conduct at sentencing.124  In order to overcome any constitutional 
477 U.S. at 82.  The cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which 
consolidated the Commonwealth’s appeals, and rejected the appellees contentions and found 
that the Act was consistent with In re Winship, Mullaney and Patterson insofar as it did not 
create a presumption with respect to any fact constituting an element of the crimes in 
question.  Id. at 83.  The court then vacated the appellees’ sentences and remanded for 
sentencing pursuant to the Act.  Id. at 83–86.  The United States Supreme Court granted a 
writ of certiorari and affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.  Id. at 93.  
For a detailed discussion, see Anthony J. Dennis, Fifth Amendment-Due Process Rights at 
Sentencing, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 646 (1986).  
 115. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
 116. Dennis, supra note 114, at 646–53. 
 117. In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 364. 
 118. Dennis, supra note 114, at 652. 
 119. Id. at 651. 
 120. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 121. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86. 
 122. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and 
the Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 726 (1994); Bilsborrow, 
supra note 3, at 289, 308.  See also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013) 
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010)) (“The touchstone for determining 
whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact 
constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.”).  
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 124. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151, 157 (1997). See also Berman, supra note 
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objections and to preserve the historic role of sentencing judges as 
experts, the Court simply sought validation in pre-Guideline 
precedent.125  The Court first turned to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 
3661, which prohibited any limitation on the types of evidence a 
sentencing judge may hear, thus, confirming that the wide discretion 
inherent in the statute survived the enactment of the Guidelines.126  
Next, the Court relied on its decision in Witte v. United States,127 which 
itself had relied on the pre-Guideline era case of Williams.  In Witte, 
the Court had held that “consideration of information about the 
defendant’s character and conduct at sentencing does not result in 
‘punishment’ for any offense other than the one of which the defendant 
was convicted.”128  Thus, the Court’s decision in Watts confirmed that 
the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing had survived the enactment 
of the Guidelines.129  However, while judges in the indeterminate 
sentencing era occasionally considered acquitted conduct, with its 
indeterminate consequences, under the Guidelines, it was mandatory, 
with determinate consequences.130 
2. Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence Post-Booker 
A mere three years after Watts, the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence took a new turn, which was fundamentally at odds with 
both Watts and its prior sentencing decisions.131  However, given the 
complex and highly debated shift in the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, only a brief sketch is provided below to show that the 
use of acquitted conduct sentencing persists.132 
69, at 17–23 (discussing cases prior Watts and noting that the Supreme Court failed to 
respond to the changes ushered in by the Guidelines); Sterback, supra note 2, at 1232–33 
(discussing the background and justification of the Watts decision). 
 125. See Sterback, supra note 2, at 1225–31. 
 126. Id. at 1231–32. 
 127. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 408 (1995). 
 128. Id. at 401. 
 129. Watts, 519 U.S. at 151–52. 
 130. See Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 308–09 & n. 147; Gertner, supra note 61, at 702. 
 131. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 308–09. 
 132. Many sources have discussed Booker and its progeny.  See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, 
III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 356 (2012), Bilsborrow, supra note 3; Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate 
Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (2009); 
Casey McTigue, The Impact of Post-Cunningham Judicial Review: The Impact of Gall, 
Kimbrough and Senate Bill 40 on California Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 199 
(2008); Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2012); 
Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional 
Sentencing After United States v. Booker 1–6, 18–24 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and 
_policy/files/struggle_for_constitutional_sentencing_after_booker.rev.8.16.06.doc. 
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The Supreme Court’s line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. 
New Jersey,133 Harris v. United States,134 Blakely v. Washington135 and 
United States v. Booker,136 dramatically altered the sentencing 
landscape.137  Under these cases, any sentencing fact that has the effect 
of increasing the statutory maximum punishment,138 beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum for an offense,139 but not any applicable 
mandatory minimum sentence,140 must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt unless admitted by the defendant.141  Some 
commentators proclaimed that these cases were evidence of how “the 
Court got its Sixth Amendment groove back” and concluded that the 
Court had finally “beg[un] to push back, crafting what would 
eventually become a powerful new Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”142 
However, such claims proved to be premature. For example, while 
the Booker court found constitutional fault with a regime that 
excessively delegated determinate fact-finding decisions to the judge at 
the expense of the jury,143 the majority splintered in deciding a proper 
remedy.144  Rather than requiring Congress to completely overhaul the 
Guidelines, the Booker court’s remedial opinion simply excised the 
language from the SRA, which required mandatory application of the 
Guidelines, rendering the Guidelines merely advisory.145  
Consequently, the real-offense components of the Guidelines, which 
permit consideration of relevant conduct, including acquitted conduct, 
remain highly influential, since judges are still required to initially 
calculate the Guidelines range as they had done so before and 
“consider” the resulting range before deciding whether to “depart” 
from the Guidelines or impose a non-Guideline sentence.146 
 133. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  The Court’s ruling in Apprendi was 
foreshadowed the year before in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 134. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
 135. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 136. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 137. See Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 309–10. 
 138. Id. at 310. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 309–15 
 142. Id. at 309. 
 143. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 313. 
 144. See Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 18–24 (criticizing the Court’s two majority 
opinions as inconsistent since the Court remedied the problem of mandatory judicial fact 
finding with even more judicial fact finding). 
 145. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 313 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 
(2005)). 
 146. Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60). 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE SRA 
Building on the Part I’s discussion of the legal framework 
governing the Guidelines and consideration of acquitted conduct under 
its relevant conduct provisions, Part II.A focuses on the various 
rationales of punishment listed in the SRA to determine whether there 
is a primary rationale or dominant philosophy of punishment.  It will be 
argued that there is no explicit guidance in the SRA on what weight to 
give the various rationales or theories of punishment reflected in the 
“factors to be considered for sentencing” in the SRA.147  This 
discussion is set out as the basis for Part II.B and Part II.C’s 
examination of the conceptual tension between the two overarching 
theories of punishment in the SRA—retributivism and utilitarianism.148  
Part II.B considers whether retributive theories can justify punishment 
of acquitted conduct.  Part II.C determines whether the utilitarian and 
consequentialist theories can justify punishment of acquitted conduct.  
While offering a full defense of either retributive theories or utilitarian 
theories of punishment is outside the scope of this Article, Part II.D 
will argue that neither retributive nor utilitarian theories of punishment 
provide a firm, coherent or stable foundation for considering acquitted 
conduct at sentencing. 
A. Does the SRA Specify a Primary Rationale or Philosophy? 
While the drafters and text of the SRA expressed a fundamental 
concern with principled sentencing,149 the SRA did not, as a statutory 
matter, adopt a particular punishment philosophy.150  Consequently, 
various commentators and the lower courts have struggled to apply a 
consistent philosophy of punishment and reached conflicting 
conclusions.151  The conceptual and procedural struggles of the federal 
sentencing system have been criticized as a “conceptual anti-
movement”152 because they were motivated less by an express pursuit 
of a new sentencing theory and more a rejection of the rehabilitative 
ideal to eliminate sentencing disparities that resulted from discretionary 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (listing “factors to be considered”). 
 148. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at 
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 87 (2011). 
 149. Berman, supra note 69, at 11 & n.54 (citing Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Taking 
Purposes Seriously: The Neglected Requirement of Guideline Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 295, 295 (1991) (noting Congress made one principle clear: the “purposes of 
sentencing” listed in § 3553 were to play a central role)). 
 150. Id. at 11. 
 151. Id. at 11–12. 
 152. Id. at 11.  
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sentencing practices.153 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists all of the traditional justifications of 
punishment and invites inconsistency,154 by requiring judges to 
consider a variety of different purposes and then, presumably, to give 
priority to one.155  As noted by Professor Andrew Ashworth, this “pick-
and-mix” approach appears to have some political popularity as similar 
methods are now followed in England and Wales, Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia, “despite the low value that it assigns to the rule 
of law.”156 
As noted by Professor Michael Tonry, whether a sentencing 
system or practice can be said to work depends on “what it is supposed 
to do, and how well it does that.”157  Examination of the purposes of 
punishment refers to the “normative rationales such as retribution or 
crime prevention through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
moral education.”158  “Normative purposes provide the ultimate criteria 
by which the justness of a punishment system is assessed.”159  
According to Kenneth R. Feinberg,160 Congress was ambivalent about 
clearly defining the role and priority of sentencing purposes and thus 
largely “fudged the issue in drafting” the SRA.161 Scholars such as 
Andrew von Hirsch,162 Aaron J. Rappaport163 and Paul H. Robinson164 
have questioned whether the sentencing guidelines provide any 
principled guidance about the purpose of punishment.165 
Ultimately, Stephen Breyer, who worked on the original 
Commission and now serves as Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 11–12; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 155. See ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 77. 
 156. Id at 77–78. 
 157. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 
(2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 13.  
 160. Kenneth Feinberg is an attorney in Washington, formerly Special Counsel to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and Consultant to the United States Sentencing Commission. 
He is a primary author of the federal legislation creating the United States Sentencing 
Commission. 
 161. Berman, supra note 69, at 12 n.57 (citing Kenneth R. Feingberg, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 
326, 326 (1991)). 
 162. Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled 
Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367 (1989).  
 163. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 
Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2003). 
 164. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1987).  
 165. See Berman, supra note 69, at 12. 
 
YALINCAK FINAL 8/21/2014  4:07 PM 
2014] ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING 695 
confirmed that while the Sentencing Commission initially considered 
adopting a primary rationale or specific purpose of punishment, it 
eventually chose not to do so.166  More recent studies, such as Paul J. 
Hofer and Mark H. Allenbaugh’s study,167concluded that the 
philosophy underlying the Guidelines is one of “modified just 
deserts,”168 a form of Norval Morris’169 “limiting retributivism.”170  
This approach places “primary emphasis on punishment proportionate 
to the seriousness of the crime and, within the broad parameters of this 
retributivism, lengthier incarceration for offenders who are most likely 
to recidivate.”171  However, while limiting retributivism as a rationale 
for punishment simply sets upper “deserved” or “undeserved” limits, it 
does not necessarily satisfy the demands of distributive justice or 
provide a workable structure.  In other words, limiting retributivism 
does not say much about the Guideline as “most penal codes are . . . 
constructed on lines consistent with limiting retributivism, providing 
maximum sentences which set the upper limit to severity without 
obliging the court to impose the maximum”172 and is more properly 
characterized as a limiting principle rather than a rationale.173 
Next, Rappaport’s174 rational reconstruction of the Guidelines 
suggested that the underlying philosophy was a utilitarian theory of 
punishment.175  However, since the Supreme Court’s Booker decision, 
there is a growing appreciation and consensus on the fragmented and 
muddled nature of sentencing policy in the United States.176  Berman 
has argued that the SRA was focused more on a rejection of “the old 
 166. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1988)). 
 167. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and 
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 
(2003). 
 168. Id. at 51–52. 
 169. Professor Norval Morris was Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, a 
criminologist, and a vocal advocate of criminal justice and mental health reform. Morris’s 
theory of “limiting retributivism” supports a retributivist system of punishment, but with 
attempts to appeal to certain utilitarian concerns.  For a detailed discussion, see Matthew 
Haist, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable In A World 
of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 792 (2009) and Richard 
S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME AND JUST. 363 (1997). 
 170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 14 (citations omitted). 
 171. Id. 
 172. CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 46 
(1999) (citations omitted). 
 173. See id.; Haist, supra note 169, at 802–03.  
 174. Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557 (2003).  
 175. Id. at 561. 
 176. Tonry, supra note 157, at 1–2. 
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conceptual sentencing model”177 than developing a new one.178  In the 
same vein, Tonry has suggested that “[t]here is no overriding theory or 
model . . . .  [N]o widely shared understandings about what sentencing 
can or should accomplish or about [the] conceptions of justice it should 
incorporate or reflect.”179  Drawing on this continuing academic 
debate, the Commission’s own statements, and the Supreme Court’s 
post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence, the conclusive conceptual 
philosophy of the SRA appears to be that there would be no conceptual 
philosophy.180 
B. Does Retributivism in the SRA Justify Acquitted Conduct 
Sentencing? 
At the top of the list of the § 3553(a)(2) factors is retribution: “the 
need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment.”181  Retributivism is often understood as “backward 
looking, focusing primarily on primarily on the criminal and the crime 
committed,”182 as opposed to deterrence, discussed infra, “which looks 
forward to the future gains that flow from punishment (while 
neglecting the actual crime committed).”183  However, retributivism is 
not only one theory, but rather several theories.184  For retributivists, 
“[i]n terms of the three main issues in the justifications of 
punishment—Why punish?  Whom to punish?  How much to 
punish?—desert theorists agree in principle about the second and 
third.”185 
As to the first question, Legal Philosopher and Professor H.L. 
Hart has suggested that “deterrence is why we punish, but retributivism 
governs how and whom we punish”186 or cast in Kantian terms “[a 
retributive system of punishment would be] ‘deterrence in its threat, 
 177. Berman, supra note 69, at 15. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Tonry, supra note 157, at 1. 
 180. See Berman, supra note 69, at 15. 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 182. Mark D. White, Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, in  
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 254 (Mark D. White ed., 2009). 
 183. Id. (citations omitted). 
 184. For concise summaries of retributivism and deterrence, see Anthony Duff, Legal 
Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 13, 2013), http:// 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment. 
 185. Desert, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra 
note 29, at 102.  
 186. WHITE, supra note 182, at 256 (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968)). 
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retribution in its execution.’” 187  As noted by Mark D. White,188 this 
hybrid theory amounts to the standard deterrence approach limited by 
negative retributivism, which prohibits intentional punishment of the 
innocent, as well as disproportionate penalties.189  However, the 
fundamental premise of this hybrid theory has been criticized since the 
“ethical foundations of deterrence and retributivism are mutually 
exclusive, and any combination thereof will compromise them both.”190  
Michael Moore191 argues that those who commit crimes deserve to be 
punished for the same reason as those who commit civil wrongs.192 
More recently, Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth’s193 
answer to this question centers on the communicative force of 
punishment as a justification for the imposition of punishment.194  
Desert theory is a modern form of retributive philosophy and, like 
retributivism, comes in various forms.195  Just desert theory, as 
developed by von Hirsh and Ashworth196 has two intertwined 
justifications.197  Desert is “an integral part of everyday judgments and 
blame”198 and state punishment institutionalizes this censuring 
function.199  Thus, sentences communicate official censure or blame:200 
punishments are different from taxes or quarantines because of their 
special communicative function201 to the offender, the victim and 
society.202  To this normative reason, this model adds a prudential or 
 187. Id. (citing B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, 
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151–200 (1989)). 
 188. See, e.g., id. at 257; Mark D. White, A Kantian Critique of Neoclassical Law & 
Economics, 18 REV. POL. ECON. 235–52 (2004).  
 189. WHITE, supra note 182, at 257. 
 190. Id. (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 166–68 (1990) and Alan H. Goldman, The 
Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 42–58 (1979)). 
 191. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PLACING BLAME: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2010).  Michael S. Moore, University of Illinois, College of 
Law Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair, Co-Director, Program in Law and Philosophy. 
 192. WHITE, supra note 182, at 256.  
 193. See generally Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, The Sentencing Theory Debate: 
Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278 (2007) 
(discussing ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: 
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005)). 
 194. See id. at 281. 
 195. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 88. 
 196. Id. at 88 n. 90. 
 197. Id. at 88. 
 198. Id. (citations omitted). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 282–83.  
 202. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 88. 
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consequentialist rationale:203 hard treatment.204  This preventative 
element is designed to add incentive to obey the law and act as 
deterrence.205  This preventative or consequentialist element is 
characterized by Ashworth as a “contingent foundation”206 for the 
sentencing system, subject to the requirements that it be “imposed only 
on those who have actually done wrong and only in proportion to their 
wrong.”207  Proportionality, in its two senses, is the touchstone of the 
punishment rationale underlying just desert theory: ordinal 
proportionality concerns the relative seriousness of the offense; and 
cardinal proportionality relates the original ranking to a scale of 
punishments, and requires that the penalty should not be out of 
proportion to the gravity of the crime involved.208  Von Hirsch suggests 
that sentencing policy makers can rank the seriousness of various 
crimes ordinally, that is, relative to each other, but that the cardinal or 
absolute severity of the scale of punishment required by just desert is 
indeterminable.209 
However, retribution has been criticized since it equates criminal 
wrongdoing with morality even though not all crimes are immoral, and 
not all moral failings are typically punished.210  Thus, retributive justice 
may treat innocent and guilty parties alike, despite the fact that one 
party lacks culpability.211  Additionally, retributive sentencing lacks 
uniformity allowing an innocent party to receive a harsher penalty than 
a similarly situated innocent party.212  However, eliminating 
punishment would have the same distorting effect on the comparative 
account of desert.213  In other words, the guilty person is treated equally 
with the innocent even though, on a comparative basis, he deserves to 
be treated worse.214  Drawing from Moore’s discussion of coherence 
theories of justification in ethics,215 moral desert can be justified in 
comparison to utilitarian theories of punishment, “by showing that it 
 203. Id. at 89. 
 204. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283.  
 205. Id.  
 206. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 89. 
 207. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283.  
 208. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 89. 
 209. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & 
JUST. 55 (1992). 
 210. See White, supra note 188. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent, 2 
L. & PHIL. 233, 238 (1983) 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: 
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 111. 
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best accounts for those of our more particular judgments that we also 
believe to be true.”216  Retribution best accounts for our “more 
particular judgments” by absolutely forbidding the punishment of the 
innocent; utilitarian theories of punishment “may sometimes require 
the punishment of an innocent person or the excessive punishment of 
an offender” to achieve fear of punishment in other persons.217  
Further, as illustrated by Professor Ronald Dworkin’s example, a 
mistaken conviction involves a moral harm (an undeserved stigma), in 
addition to bare harm (loss of liberty), and, thus, it is morally worse 
than the equivalent bare harm (loss of liberty) suffered at the hands of 
an un-deterred criminal.218 
Retributivist theories rely on the fundamental proposition that 
punishment should only be “imposed only on those who have . . . [been 
convicted] . . . and only in proportion to their wrong.”219  This 
limitation implicates “Hart’s famous distinction between the general 
justifying aims of a system of punishment and the principles of 
distribution that operate within such a system.”220  Ashworth and von 
Hirsch argue that “[o]nce the state has undertaken to institute a system 
of punishment . . . the distribution of punishment is subject to the 
demands of distributive justice, and the appropriate criterion for 
distribution is individual desert.”221  For example, Henry Lombard, Jr. 
was charged with two counts of murder in Superior Court in the State 
of Maine.222  After a week and half long trial, the state jury acquitted 
Mr. Lombard on both counts.223  However, just a year after his 
acquittal on state charges of murder, a federal jury convicted him of 
one count of illegal possession of a firearm.224  Since the firearm was 
the alleged murder weapon in the earlier state case, the federal judge 
was able to consider the murders for which Lombard was acquitted and 
using the relevant conduct provision of the Guidelines apply the base 
offense level for murder.225  The sentencing judge imposed a sentence 
of life imprisonment on Lombard, the statutory maximum on the 
 216. Id. 
 217. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 42. 
 218. Alexander, supra note 212, at 238.  
 219. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283. 
 220. Id. (citing H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 2008)). 
 221. Id.  
 222. United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1995). See also Ngov, supra note 
1, at 236–39 (summarizing facts of Lombard case). 
 223. Lombard, 72 F.3d at 173.  
 224. Id. at 173. 
 225. Id. at 172. 
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firearm charge.226 
The use of acquitted conduct to impose a de facto sentence for 
murder on Lombard, without conviction for murder, cannot be justified 
by retributivist theories of punishment since retributivists do not 
support the notion of sentencing on character.  Thus, the use of 
acquitted conduct fatally undermines the foundational premise of 
retributivist theories of punishment and the state’s justification of ‘why 
we punish.’227 
C. Utilitarian or Mixed Theories of Punishment 
Proponents of forward-looking utilitarian theories of punishment, 
such as deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation,228 typically view 
both offense conduct and offender characteristics as central 
considerations when seeking to predict and prevent future criminal 
behavior.229  The aims of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 
all support punishment relative to its crime-preventative consequences, 
which are advanced within a utilitarian framework.230  Under this 
framework, the justification for punishment and the measure of 
punishment are found in a “calculation of its utility compared with the 
attendant disutilities.”231 
Deterrence—specific and general—“is one of a number of 
consequentialist aims which share the goal of preventing crime.”232  It 
has a consequentialist rationale in the sense that it looks to the 
preventative consequences of sentences.233  Under deterrence theory, 
three factors affect a sanction’s deterrent value: severity, certainty and 
celerity.234  A sentencing system based on special deterrence would 
need to ensure that courts have detailed information on the character, 
circumstances and previous record of a particular offender, and would 
then require courts to calculate the sentence necessary to induce the 
 226. Id. at 179. 
 227. See Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing Enhancement: Rationales and 
Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality Principles and Social Equality 
Goals, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVE 122 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsh eds., 2010). 
 228. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 39; Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender 
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 289 (2005). 
 229. Berman, supra note 228, at 289. 
 230. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 39. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 78. 
 234. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 61. 
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particular offender to comply.235  However, punishments might have to 
be increased substantially for persistent offenders, at the risk of the 
parsimony principle,236 and at the risk of unwarranted sentencing 
disparities between similarly situated offenders since each sentence 
would be specially calculated so as to influence the specific offender 
before the court.237 
The objection to general deterrence theories have often been 
expressed in the Kantian maxim, “a person should always be treated as 
an end in himself [or herself], and never only as a means.”238  Since 
general deterrence theory’s distinctive aim and method is to create fear 
of punishment in other persons, it may sometimes require the 
punishment of an innocent person or the excessive punishment of an 
offender in order to achieve this “greater social effect.”239  This 
approach regards citizens merely as numbers to be aggregated in an 
overall social calculation and shows no respect for the moral worth and 
autonomy of each individual.  Furthermore, citizens should not be used 
merely as a means to an end.240  While punishment is a means to an 
end, punishment of any given individual cannot and should not be 
justified solely by reference to wider social benefits.241 
Although deterrence is plainly listed as a factor in § 3553(a)242 the 
Commission has held that deterrence is not the primary rationale of the 
Guideline.243  Both specific and general deterrence figures prominently 
as a goal in the SRA; however, their utility in drafting specific 
guideline provisions and ranges is dependent upon empirical data 
regarding “the likelihood of detection, prosecution, and conviction” for 
a particular type of crime.244  This is so that severity levels can be 
adjusted.245  Research on deterrence has not yielded any findings to 
inform the design of specific guideline provisions, leading most 
academic research to agree that deterrence cannot be the Guideline’s 
primary rationale.246 
 235. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 41–42. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 78. 
 239. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 41–42 (citations omitted). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 243. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 61. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 61–62. 
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Incapacitation is, in essence, a way to deal with offenders in such 
a way as to “make them incapable of offending for substantial periods 
of time.”247  The SRA presents incapacitation in terms that Ashworth 
has framed in its “popular form of public protection.”248  The 
significant concern with incapacitation is displayed in the Guidelines 
and related commentary where it directs the Commission’s attention to 
offender’s’ “criminal history . . . and . . . degree of dependence upon 
criminal activity for a livelihood,”249 and it mandates sentences “near 
the maximum term authorized” for repeat drug and violent offenders250 
and a “substantial term of imprisonment” for certain other categories of 
repeat and high-risk offenders.251 
In his rational reconstruction approach to the Guidelines, 
Rappaport argued “utilitarianism, offers the best reconstruction of the 
four critical guideline provisions under analysis;”252 however, he fails 
to overcome both empirical and principled objections.253  Richard 
Singer, a strict desert theorist, has argued that predictions should have 
no place in sentencing and that sentences should be based solely on the 
seriousness of the current offense.254  Andrew von Hirsch has argued 
that sentences for first time offenders and increasing relative sentences 
for repeat offenders can be justified within the strictures of the desert 
theory by the increased culpability of someone who re-offends after 
having already been warned and punished.255  For strict utilitarians, 
preventative detention can be justified if the harm prevented through 
incarceration is greater than the harm of incarceration itself.256  
Incapacitation has drawn empirical criticism for drawing into its net 
more ‘non-dangerous’ than ‘dangerous’ offenders, with a high rate of 
false positives.257  The principled objections parallel the objection to 
deterrent sentencing: “individuals are being punished, over and above 
what they deserve, in the hope of protecting future victims from 
 247. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 84. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 57 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(11) (2002)). 
 250. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)). 
 251. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)). 
 252. Rappaport, supra note 174, at 642.  See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 
61–62. 
 253. See Rappaport, supra note 174; Berman, supra note 69. 
 254. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 57 (citing RICHARD SINGER, JUST 
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY & DESERT (1979)). 
 255.  Id. (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 77–78, 131–32 (1986)).  
 256. Id. (citation omitted). 
 257. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 84. 
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harm.”258  However, while hypothetical examples involving high-risk 
offenders are appealing, at present there is no empirical data to 
“sacrific[e] one offender’s liberty in the hope of increasing the future 
safety of others.”259 
The rehabilitative rationale seeks to justify compulsory measures 
as a means of achieving the prevention of crime, through rehabilitation 
of the offender.260  However, in the context of the SRA, while the SRA 
requires that the Guidelines accommodate the statutory purposes of 
rehabilitation, its role is limited, as Congress has specifically stated that 
“imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction 
and rehabilitation.”261 
D. Do Either Retributive or Utilitarian Theories Justify the Use of 
Acquitted Conduct? 
Recalling that acquitted conduct was permitted during the 
indeterminate sentencing era when the rehabilitative ideal prevailed, 
utilitarian theories of punishment—deterrence, incapacitation and, to a 
lesser degree, rehabilitation—continue to, at least in part, underpin its 
use today.  As noted in Part I.E supra, courts have gotten around the 
possibility that they may inadvertently punish innocent offenders by re-
characterizing elements of a separate (uncharged or acquitted) criminal 
offence as sentencing factors,262 without regard to their identical impact 
on the defendant: increased punishment.  Whatever the merits of this 
semantic flip-flop in the Court’s jurisprudence, the gravitational pull of 
acquitted conduct sentencing invariably increases the possible sentence 
and, necessarily, the risk of punishment of innocent individuals.263  
While a jury verdict of “not guilty” does not necessarily always equate 
to “innocent,”264 this reliance upon ‘facts’ often leads to “moral 
slippage in that the so-called facts often become the moral qualities 
relied upon by the retributionist.”265  Next, the failure of utilitarian 
approaches to encompass the notion of desert leads to difficulties in 
 258. Id. at 85. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 86. 
 261. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (describing duties of 
the commission). 
 262. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 263. See Ngov, supra note 1; Bilsborrow, supra note 3; Semones, supra note 11; 
Gertner, supra note 61.  
 264. Mark T. Doerr, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality of Acquitted-
Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 243, 261–62 (2009) (citations 
omitted).  
 265. ROMAN TOMASIC & IAN DOBINSON, THE FAILURE OF IMPRISONMENT: AN 
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 18 (1979). 
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accounting for the concept of individual responsibility.266  Recalling 
the Kantian injunction above, the use of acquitted conduct also fails to 
satisfy the Hartian command that “a theory of punishment should 
include a link with both the general social justification for the 
institution of punishment and the principles of distribution which 
restrict its imposition to properly convicted offenders and which place 
limits on the amount of punishment.”267 
Like retributivism, utilitarianism and its related theories are not 
well suited to provide a coherent and consistent foundation for 
acquitted conduct sentencing.  This is because utilitarianism is not 
limited to criminal law.268  Utilitarians seek to maximize social welfare 
and permit deviations only if doing so maximizes social welfare.269  
Because they are guaranteed by the Constitution, the right to due 
process, and the right to a jury trial must rest on utilitarian grounds 
since they are meant to maximize social welfare.270  Accordingly, 
permitting the use of acquitted conduct through the relevant conduct 
provisions of the Guidelines real offense sentencing system does not 
reflect the purposes and significance of the these fundamental rights.  
Further, even if such rights have no utilitarian grounds, these rights 
should trump utilitarian values.271  This is not to say that rights should 
always trump utilitarian values—constitutional rights must yield when 
the societal costs of absolute enforcement would be too high—as 
Justice Jackson stated, the Constitution is not a “suicide pact.”272 
Consequently, while the drafters and text of the SRA expressed a 
 266. Id. 
 267. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, 
supra note 29, at 43. 
 268. Hessick & Hessisk, supra note 148, at 88. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id at 88–89. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 90 (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) and RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 41 (2006)).  Justice Jackson’s dissent in Terminiello is 
most famous for its final paragraph:  
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty 
means the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local 
attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. 
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with 
order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does 
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will 
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. 
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 37.  See also Patricia R. Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First 
Amendment Protections for the Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 915 (2000) (noting that even 
Justice Black, who took an absolutist stance in interpreting the First Amendment, refused to 
extend First Amendment protections to all speech). 
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fundamental concern with principled sentencing, by omitting a primary 
rationale or cohesive purpose of punishment, they undermined the 
normative justifications and purposes of punishment by the state.  
While at the time the SRA was enacted this was a defensible approach 
since the Guidelines were mandatory and judges had very little 
discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines,273 since the Guidelines 
have been rendered advisory by the Supreme Court’s Booker 
decision,274 the unprincipled nature of sentencing practice has been 
thrown into sharp relief.  The lack of direction is a “cafeteria system” 
of sentencing,275 a “prescription for sentencing anarchy,”276 and 
“licence to judges to pursue their own penal philosophies.”277   Yet, 
even if the SRA had specified a primary rationale or specific purpose 
of punishment, as shown above, the use of any form of acquitted 
conduct under the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines cannot 
be justified by either retributive or utilitarian theories of punishment 
without undermining the very purposes and justifications of 
punishment by the state. 
III. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACQUITTED 
CONDUCT SENTENCING 
The practical consequence of using acquitted conduct under the 
relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines are significantly longer 
prison sentences with a disproportionate impact on the prison terms of 
minorities.  The increased prison terms have ranged from a number of 
 273. Berman, supra note 69, at 11–12. 
 274. Since Booker, the Supreme Court in a series of cases has re-affirmed that the 
Guidelines are now “truly advisory” and that the touchstone of sentencing are the “factors to 
be considered in imposing a sentence” listed in § 3553(a). For discussion of post-Booker 
developments see Gertner, supra note 61, at 704–07 (providing an in-depth discussion of 
post-Booker case law); Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 314–15 (citing statistics which reveal 
that post-Booker, approximately 85.9% of offenders receive sentences adhering to the 
Guideline range compared with 90.6% prior to Booker) (citations omitted); Peter Erlinder, 
“Doing Time” . . . After the Jury Acquits: Resolving the Post-Booker “Acquitted Conduct” 
Sentencing Dilemma, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79 (2008); David C. Hollman, Death 
By A Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita and Gall, The Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth 
Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (2008); Anne E. Zygadlo, Circuit Circus: What 
Is the Correct Standard of Review Applicable to Supervised Release Appeals After United 
States v. Booker?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (2011); D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? 
Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 DUQ. L. 
REV. 641 (2011); Nicholas A. Deuschle, Fun With Numbers: Gall’s Mixed Message 
Regarding Variance Calculations, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2013).  
 275. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331 (2d ed. 1995). 
 276. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences, CRIM. L. REV. 340, 
350 (1989). 
 277. ASHWORTH, supra note 275, at 63. 
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months to life imprisonment based solely on acquitted conduct.  When 
the practical considerations are considered along with the constitutional 
and normative concerns, it becomes clear that acquitted conduct 
sentencing and the relevant conduct provisions of the guidelines 
“undermines the importance of the substantive criminal law, nullifies 
the law of evidence, and is irreconcilable with the notion that 
punishment can be imposed only in respect of offenses admitted or 
proven.”278  Nevertheless, acquitted conduct sentencing remains 
entirely permissible and is, in fact, required in the first step of 
sentencing under the now advisory sentencing guidelines.279  Judges 
must still initially calculate the applicable sentencing guideline range 
for defendants, taking into account any uncharged, acquitted, and/or 
unrelated conduct, which may affect a particular defendant’s 
sentencing range, before deciding to depart from the applicable 
sentencing guideline range or impose a non-guideline sentence.280  But, 
how could this practice have survived the Blakely-Apprendi line of 
cases?  The Supreme Court’s Blakely opinion made it clear that the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury-found facts was not necessarily limited 
to the imposition of sentences above the statutory maximum.281  
Writing for the majority in Blakely, Justice Scalia made it clear that 
both Apprendi and Blakely were based upon much more fundamental 
considerations than properly allocating factual decision-making in 
sentencing and were constitutionally grounded in the abstract question 
of:282 
the need to give intelligible content to the right of a jury trial.  That 
right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental 
reservation of power in our constitutional structure.  Just as 
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and 
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
 278. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564. 
 279. See GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE 
PRIMER 1–2 (June 2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legal/Primers/Primer_Departure_and_Variance.pdf (noting that after Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38 (2007), the sentencing court must follow a three-step process by “properly 
determin[ing] the guideline range . . . Determin[ing] whether to apply any of the guidelines’ 
departure policy statements to adjust the guideline range . . . [Finally,] consider[ing] all the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a) as a whole, including whether a variance—a 
sentence outside the advisory guideline system—is warranted.”) (citations omitted). 
 280. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should 
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guideline range . . . 
[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the 
initial benchmark”). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)–(c) 
(2012) (listing appropriate application instructions). 
 281. Erlinder, supra note 274, at 93.  
 282. Id. 
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judiciary . . . .  Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the 
judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s 
verdict.  Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the 
control that the Framer’s intended.283 
However, the Booker majority’s remedial opinion, in throwing out 
mandatory guideline sentencing in favor of the “uniformity” achieved 
by “real conduct” sentencing on the basis of PSRs prepared by 
probation officers, paradoxically resulted in the Court “remedying” the 
judicial fact-finding at issue in Apprendi and Blakely with judicial fact-
finding.284 
On one hand, the five justices in the majority in Blakely285 and in 
the constitutional majority in Booker286 were deeply disturbed by the 
guidelines requiring an equivalent of a conviction for “uncharged, 
dismissed and acquitted crimes without the fundamental components 
the adversary system the Framers intended, i.e., notice, jury trial, and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”287  These justices held that “real 
conduct” sentencing and the related relevant conduct provisions of the 
guidelines are an “assault” on the Sixth Amendment’s “fundamental 
reservation of power” in the people within “our constitutional 
structure.”288  They noted that “[t]he jury could not function as circuit 
breaker in the State’s machinery of justice if it were relegated to 
making a determination that the defendant at some point did something 
wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the 
 283. Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004)). 
 284. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 20 (citing Michael W. McConnell, The Booker 
Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006)); David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The 
Impact of Appellate Review on Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2006); 
Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing 
After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 182; M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater 
Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 564 (2005); United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 
2d 282, 288–301 (D. Mass. 2006).  See Bilsborrow, supra note 3.  
 285. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 21. 
 286. Id. at 21–22 (noting the distinction between the constitutional majority and the 
remedial majority). In Booker, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion answering the 
question of whether the application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment  under 
the Apprendi line of cases, while Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion answering the 
question of how to remedy the Sixth Amendment violation identified by the Court.  Id. 
 287. Id. at 21 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–07) (noting that not even Apprendi’s 
critics can support the “absurd result” of a man being sentenced “for committing murder, 
even if the jury convicted him only of possessing the firearm used to commit it—or of 
making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene” and noting that Blakely was 
sentenced based on the “very charge” that was dismissed pursuant to his guilty plea).  See 
also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 273 (2005) (noting that Booker was sentenced 
based on uncharged crimes). 
 288. Id. (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–08, 313). 
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crime the State actually seeks to punish.”289  Perhaps, more 
importantly, these justices noted that had the Sixth Amendment issue 
been raised in Witte and Watts, they would have decided those cases 
differently.290  In short, these justices were aware that the “facts” of 
uncharged, dismissed, and acquitted offenses are determined unfairly 
and unreliably—without notice by indictment or plea, and based on 
“hearsay-riddled presentence reports” prepared by probation officers 
who the judge thinks “more likely got it right than got it wrong.”291 
On the other hand, Justice Breyer described as “stunningly 
uninformed by actual practice”292 by Amy Baron-Evans,293 portrayed 
“real conduct” sentencing as merely the “way in which” the offense 
was committed based on “factual information . . . uncovered after trial” 
contained in the “presentence report,” which is determined “fairly” by 
probation officers.294  Despite Justice Breyer’s fanciful view of 
sentencing in practice, Justice Ginsburg inexplicably signed on to this 
description in the Booker remedy opinion.295  However, Justice 
Breyer’s utopian description of the real conduct sentencing provisions 
is no more than “wishful policy theories that can easily be 
discredited.”296 
Part III.A briefly highlights the racial disparities in sentencing 
under the Guidelines’ real conduct and related relevant conduct 
provisions and provides examples of cases where defendants have been 
sentenced to substantially longer prison sentences.  Part III.B explores 
how the use of acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the 
justifications for punishment and weakens the rule of law.  Part III.C 
discusses how the use of acquitted conduct and the relevant conduct 
provisions of the Guidelines can cause disproportionate severity and 
unwarranted uniformity in sentencing and undermine the substantive 
criminal law.  Part III.D focuses on the impact of acquitted conduct at 
sentencing on the burden of proof and law of evidence.  Part III.E 
 289. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–07. 
 290. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 21.  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 240. 
 291. Booker, 543 U.S. at 304. See also Ngov, supra note 1, at 239 (“Hearsay, double 
hearsay, and even triple hearsay is permissible as long as there is an ‘indicia of 
reliability.’ ” ) (citations omitted). 
 292. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22. 
 293. Amy Baron-Evans serves as a Sentencing Resource Counsel for the Federal Public 
and Community Defenders.  
 294. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22; Booker, 543 U.S. at 250–57, 326–29. 
 295. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22 (noting that in her dissent in Washington v. 
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 224 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Justice Ginsburg noted that 
her position on “real conduct” sentencing under a de facto mandatory guideline system had 
not changed.) 
 296. Id. 
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highlights how acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the role of the 
jury.  Finally, Part III.F comments on the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Alleyne v. United States.297 
A. Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Contributes to Longer Prison 
Sentences and With a Disproportionate Impact on Racial and Ethnic 
Minorities 
The relevant conduct provisions of the sentencing guidelines, 
which permit the use of acquitted conduct, results in unwarranted 
sentencing disparity.  In practice, the use of acquitted conduct at 
sentencing under the broad relevant conduct provisions of the 
Guidelines is not consistently applied because of “ambiguity in the 
language of the rule, discomfort with the role of law enforcement in 
establishing relevant conduct, and discomfort with the severity of 
sentences that often result.”298  Research by the Federal Judicial Center 
showed that probation officers applying the relevant conduct rules 
sentenced three defendants in widely divergent ranges, “ranging from 
57 to 136 months for one defendant, 37 to 136 months for the second 
defendant, and 24 to 136 months for the third defendant.”299 
Further, in federal prison, people of color and ethnic minorities 
make up more than seventy-five percent of the prison population, 
although they constitute only twenty-five percent of the U.S. 
population.300  Put another way, the federal rate of incarceration is 412 
per 100,000 residents for whites, 742 per 100,000 residents for 
Hispanics, and 2,290 per 100,000 residents for African-Americans 
according to statistics from the Bureau of Justice in 2006 and 2008 
U.S. Census.301  How about the length of their sentences?302  As noted 
by U.S. District Judge Lynn Adelman and his law clerk Jon Dietrich, 
the average sentence for an African-American offender is about 
twenty-five percent longer than for a white offender.303  Simply stated, 
more black and ethnic minority defendants have acquitted conduct used 
 297. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 298. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 24 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 
91, at 87). 
 299. Id. at 25. 
 300. Carol A. Brook, Racial Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 
LITIG. 15, 15 (2008) (citing statistics from Bureau of Justice).  See also RICHARD S. FRASE, 
JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLE AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM xiv (2013) 
(noting that punitive shifts and racial disparity will be recurring problems). 
 301. Brook, supra note 300, at 15.  
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. (citing Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and 
Fairness in Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2007)). 
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against them under the broad relevant conduct provisions of the 
Guidelines than white defendants; as a result, acquitted conduct may be 
used as an unintended proxy for racial disparagement.  While 
sentencing scholars disagree on the reasons for this disparity,304 they do 
agree on the impact of acquitted conduct sentencing under the relevant 
conduct provisions of the Guidelines: longer prison terms for offenders.  
By requiring longer prison terms, acquitted conduct sentencing also 
heightens inherent racial disparities under the federal Guidelines. 
For example, in 2007 Antwuan Ball, a 37-year-old African-
American resident of the District of Columbia was charged with 
multiple drug offenses, racketeering, murder, conspiracy and dozens of 
other charges.305  The jury acquitted him on all charges except a single 
$600 drug transaction.306  This sole count of conviction corresponded 
to an advisory Guideline range of approximately three years 
imprisonment with a statutory maximum of forty years;307 however, he 
was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment based on the acquitted 
conduct.308 
Similarly, in 2009 Gary Williams, an African-American resident 
of the State of Maryland, was convicted on federal charges of cocaine 
distribution and one count of distributing fifty grams or more of 
cocaine base.309  However, at sentencing the judge found Williams 
responsible for the first-degree murder of an intended prosecution 
witness.310  Williams was neither charged with a murder nor was he 
ever convicted of murder.311  Nevertheless, Williams was sentenced to 
life imprisonment on the drug conviction based on the relevant conduct 
provisions of the Guidelines, which required cross-referencing the base 
offense level for first-degree murder, which called for a life 
sentence.312  The sentence was affirmed on appeal because the statutory 
maximum for the drug charges was life-imprisonment.313 
 304. Id. 
 305. McElhatton, supra note 27 (detailing facts of case).  
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Jim McElhatton, D.C. Man Gets 18 Years for $600 Drug Deal, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/17/dc-man-get-18-years-in-
600-drug-deal/?page=all.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling.  United States v. Johnson, No. 08-3033, 2014 WL 982870, at *5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 309. Leonard & Dieter, supra note 109, at 292 (citing United States v. Williams, 343 
Fed. App’x 912–13 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 310. Id. (citing Williams, 343 Fed. App’x at 913). 
 311. Id.  
 312. Id. at 292–93. 
 313. Id. at 293. 
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B. Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Undermines the Justifications for 
Punishment by the State 
Given the historical and philosophical commitment to liberty of 
the Anglo-American system of criminal law, the imposition of criminal 
sanctions is justified only on individuals whose acts violate the 
criminal law and who have admitted their unlawful acts or have been 
convicted at trial on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.314  
The criminal conviction standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
as required by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause serves as a 
foundational principle of American criminal justice—to protect against 
factual error whenever a potential loss of liberty is at stake, regardless 
of the identity of the fact-finder or whether the finding results in 
“conviction” of a “crime” or is merely treated as a sentencing factor. 
As explained by Justice Brennan:315 
There is always, in litigation, a margin of error, representing error 
in fact-finding, which both parties must take into account.  Where 
one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a 
criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to 
him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . 
convincing the fact-finder of his guilt.316 
Therefore, the jury determines “legal guilt . . . by the highest 
standard of proof we know, beyond a reasonable doubt.  And when a 
jury acquit[s] a defendant based on that standard, one . . . [expects] no 
additional criminal punishment would follow.”317  Since under both a 
retributive or utilitarian model of punishment the offender is only to be 
punished after formal conviction, punishment of defendants on the 
basis of acquitted conduct, no matter how convincing the evidence put 
forth by the state (especially for conduct for which the jury returned a 
verdict of “not guilty”), challenges the “historic link between verdict 
and judgment”318 that justifies the imposition of punishment by the 
state in the first place.319 
The relevant conduct provisions in the sentencing guidelines 
essentially facilitate conviction for bad character, which is not 
permitted under either a retributive or utilitarian model of 
 314. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564. 
 315. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358–68 (1970). 
 316. Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)). 
 317. Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and 
Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 433 (1999).  
 318. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482–83 (2000) (citation omitted). 
 319. See id. 
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punishment.320  More crucially, acquitted conduct sentencing 
encourages convictions that may often be “based on facts that often are 
not real at all.”321  As observed by the Commission, “‘research [has] 
suggested significant disparities in how [the relevant conduct] rules 
were applied’, and ‘questions remain about how consistently it can be 
applied’. . . [since] . . . ‘disputes must be resolved based on potentially 
untrustworthy factors, such as the testimony of co-conspirators.’ ” 322  
Moreover, “[m]ost probation officers incorporate the prosecutor’s 
written version of events verbatim into the PSR.”323  More troubling, 
perhaps, is the fact that the mere inclusion of factual allegations in a 
PSR in several circuits transforms them ipse dixit into “evidence,” 
which “relieves the government of introducing actual evidence and 
shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove it.”324 
Simply stated, this process results in “punishment for acts not 
constitutionally proven.”325  Rather, the system “relies on ‘findings’ 
that rest on ‘a mishmash of data[,] including blatantly self-serving 
hearsay largely served up by the Department [of Justice].”326  Thus, the 
Booker remedy “continues to provide safe harbor for the imaginative 
fantasies of what really occurred under the rubric of real [relevant] 
conduct.”327 
C. Subversion of the Substantive Criminal Law 
The stakes at sentencing are high—deprivation of liberty and 
property—and the courts and legislatures generally attempt to specify 
the elements of offenses and defenses with tedious detail.328  Why?  
Conviction and the resulting public labeling, denunciation, and possible 
 320. Frase, supra note 227, at 122. 
 321. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 23. 
 322. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 50). See also David M. 
Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial 
Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 222 (2004) (“The resulting slew of petty, 
small time dealers being charged in federal court particularly outraged some judges who felt 
federal court should be reserved for weighty matters of national concern.”). 
 323. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 84, 86); Letter from Jon 
M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, to Hon. Ricardo Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing 
Commission 21 (July 19, 2006), available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/defender_letter_to_ussc_71
906.pdf. 
 324. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 23–24, 24 n. 106 (citing to relevant cases). 
 325. Id at 24. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. (quoting Dan Markel, The Indispensable Berman on Booker, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(June 26, 2006), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2006/06/the_indispensab.html). 
 328. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1565. 
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deprivation of liberty are too important to tolerate ambiguities.329  The 
substantial burden of proof in criminal cases is a testament to the 
importance of the interests and values implicated by the substantive 
criminal law.330  However, acquitted conduct sentencing under the 
relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines is predicated on a 
primary characterization of the criminal offense331—an example of the 
“tail wagging the dog.”332  As observed by one commentator, 
Nelson Guerrero served four years in prison for crimes of which he 
was never convicted.  Robert Mercado was sentenced to seventeen 
years in prison for committing several violent crimes, even though 
a jury had acquitted him of those crimes  
. . . 
One might think that [these] individuals . . . live in a totalitarian 
regime without the protection of basic individual rights.  But they 
live (or have lived) in the United States, and their sentences were 
handed down by American trial courts and subsequently affirmed 
by appellate courts   
. . . 
American courts routinely increase sentences for reasons that seem 
to conflict with constitutional protections . . . .333 
To sum it up, the offense admitted by the defendant, or which was 
proven to a judge or jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, is 
not a limiting factor in sentencing, but simply a starting point for 
determining the base offense level in calculating the applicable 
Guideline range.334  As a consequence, the offense proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a nullity; the modified real offense approach, which 
incorporates relevant conduct and mandates consideration of acquitted 
conduct, determines the end sentence.335  As observed by Judge Oakes, 
“[t]his is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland.  As the 
Queen of Hearts might say, ‘Acquittal first, sentence afterwards.’ ” 336 
D. Subversion of the Burden of Proof and Law of Evidence 
As noted above in Part I.E, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Semones, supra note 11; Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: 
Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due 
Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992) 
 333. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 148, at 48 (citations omitted).  
 334. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564 n.48. 
 335. Id. 
 336. United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring). 
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Watts ruled that application of the preponderance standard to such 
evidence is appropriate when considering evidence at sentencing.337  
However, there are no constraints on the types of evidence that may be 
considered, provided that it can be proven by a mere preponderance of 
the evidence.  The language in § 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation 
shall be placed” on the evidence that a judge may consider at 
sentencing and the real offense sentencing.338 It follows that such 
evidence may include inadmissible hearsay;339 acquitted conduct;340 
and even evidence obtained by unconstitutional means, including 
coercion or torture.341  Exacerbating the situation, real offense 
sentencing has shifted sentencing power from the judiciary to 
prosecutors.342  The relevant conduct rules and cross-references were 
based on concerns that a pure charge system would transfer power to 
prosecutors and thereby increase disparities; however, since 
prosecutors control “facts” disclosed to probation officers in preparing 
the PSR, the rules “are not working as intended,” and “tend to work in 
one direction, i.e., to the disadvantage of defendants.”343 
For instance, where acquitted conduct is involved, “[prosecutors 
can] affect an end-run around the exclusionary rule by presenting 
evidence at sentencing that would be inadmissible at trial.”344  
Conversely, where charges were not brought or dropped, the same 
charges “can be ‘proved’ in a presentence report.”345  When there are 
disputes regarding the “factual” statements in the PSR, the Government 
need not produce the purported source of the information in court.346  
More troubling, perhaps, if the defendant contests the allegations, he or 
she may lose an acceptance of responsibility reduction347 and even 
receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice.348 
 337. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151, 157 (1997). 
 338. Doerr, supra note 264, at 249 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006)). 
 339. Id. at 250 (citations omitted); Ngov, supra note 1, at 239 (citations omitted). 
 340. Doerr, supra note 264, at 250 (citations omitted). 
 341. Id. (“[E]vidence obtained by a police officer by unconstitutional means, including 
evidence obtained via coercion or torture, can be considered at sentencing. The 
consequences is that a judge is unfettered in her consideration of the evidence at sentencing 
so long as the judge and the judge alone determines that such evidence was proved by a 
preponderance.”) (citations omitted). 
 342. See id. 
 343. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25 (citations omitted). 
 344. Doerr, supra note 264, at 250. 
 345. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25.  
 346. Id. 
 347. The Guidelines instruct the sentencing court to decrease a defendant’s offense level 
by two levels if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2012). 
 348. The Guidelines instruct the sentencing court to increase a defendant’s offense level 
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In short, the relevant conduct provisions permits “prosecutors to 
obtain, or threaten to obtain, the equivalent of a conviction on charges 
that cannot be proved with competent evidence but are impossible to 
challenge.”349  This is tantamount to lowering the overall burden of 
proof at trial.350  This creates a “winner take all”351 system: the 
conviction on one-count of a multi-count indictment is sufficient to 
trigger a Guideline range that is identical in terms of the penal 
consequences to a defendant as if he was convicted on the basis of 
allegations not proved, or even alleged in the trial phase.352  With such 
awesome power in the hand of the prosecutors, “[t]he inducement to 
plead guilty may be irresistible even to a defendant with a strong 
defense or who is actually innocent.”353 
E. The Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing Undermines the Role of 
the  Jury 
Acquitted conduct sentencing under the relevant conduct 
provisions of the Guidelines undermines the hallmark of the American 
judicial process: the right to trial by jury.354  The Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”355  However, 
the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing under the relevant 
conduct provisions of the Guidelines renders this right wholly illusory 
for three reasons.  First, while the jury is charged exclusively with 
by two levels if he “wilfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense of conviction”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2012).  
For further discussion see Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25 (citing Margareth Etienne, 
The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical 
Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425 (2004)). 
 349. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. 
 352. See id. 
 353. Id. at 26 (citing The American College of Trial Lawyers Proposed Modifications to 
the Relevant Conduct Provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1463, 1492–93 (2001); David Yallen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real Offense 
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 449 (1993); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 274 (1989)). 
 354. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 355. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See also Doerr, supra note 264 at 252 (“To the layperson, 
the Sixth Amendment means that if there is the potential that one may be subjected to 
penalty for a criminal offense, any verdict must be rendered by a jury, unless otherwise 
waived.”). 
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deciding questions of fact, its fact-finding role is eviscerated by the 
Guidelines’ requirement that a district court must enhance a 
defendant’s sentence based on acquitted conduct.356  For example, 
consider the following colloquy between defense counsel and a 
sentencing judge: 
The Court: The jury could not have made—the jury could not have 
listened to the instructions . . . . 
. . .  
[The Court:] The testimony was so strong. The Gun was even in the 
apartment. That’s all they needed. There was no dispute of that 
fact. . . 
Mr. Barroso: They perhaps didn’t believe it was being used in 
association with drug-[Counsel]related activity, your Honor. 
The Court:  Well, I’ll tell you something: I have been disappointed 
in jury verdicts  before this firearm was used . . . . 
. . . 
 [The Court:] They [the jury] had to absolutely disregard the 
testimony of a government agent for no reason—no reason. 
Mr. Barroso: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the other 
agent who testified that he  [Counsel] couldn’t be sure, your Honor. 
The Court: Well, you can take it up with an appellate court, 
because I’ve made my findings on the record.357 
Fundamentally, such action allows the judge to usurp the role of 
the jury.358  As Judge Gertner has noted, “[t]o tout the importance of 
the jury in deciding facts, even traditional sentencing facts, and then to 
ignore the fruits of its efforts makes no sense—as a matter of law or 
logic.”359 
Second, disregarding the “not guilty” verdict of the jury is 
“quintessential unauthorized punishment.”360  Every state constitution 
written between 1776 and 1787 unanimously guaranteed only one 
right: the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.361  Contravening a 
 356. See Semones, supra note 11, at 315. 
 357. United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748–49 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) 
(upholding lower court’s sentence enhancement for conduct of which the defendant was 
acquitted).  See also Gertner, supra note 317, at 434 (“At sentencing, the Court pronounced 
identical prison terms for both defendants: seventy-six months. While the Guideline range 
for DeLuna was 76 months, because he had been convicted of the weapons charge, it was 
less for Juarez-Ortega, who had been acquitted on that charge.” (citing Juarez-Ortega, 866 
F.2d at 748)). 
 358. Semones, supra note 11, at 315. 
 359. See United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 153 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 360. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 321–23. 
 361. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 
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jury’s verdict of guilt or innocence undermines the jury from fulfilling 
its key role: “protect[ing] ordinary individuals against governmental 
overreach[].”362 
Third, to the layperson, the right to trial by jury is one of the very 
few complicated legal issues with which the general public is familiar, 
and faith in the jury system is of vital importance to the legitimacy of 
the entire Anglo-American legal system.363  The jury, as an institution, 
also provides an opportunity for lay citizens to become both pupils of 
and participants in the legal and political system.364  Tocqueville 
commented that the jury “may be regarded as a gratuitous public 
school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights.”365  For 
example, consider the following letter from a juror to a defendant’s 
sentencing judge: 
We, the jury, all took our charge seriously.  We virtually gave up 
our private lives to devote our time to the cause of justice . . . . 
What does it say to our contribution as jurors when we see our 
verdicts, in my personal view, not given their proper weight.366 
Thus, a sentence that repudiates the jury’s verdict undermines the 
juror’s role as both a pupil and participant in civic affairs and is the 
“type of deviation from the public’s understanding of a defendant’s 
right to a jury trial that could undermine public confidence in the 
criminal justice system.”367 
F. Alleyne and the Continuing Fiction of the Punishment-Enhancement 
 Distinction 
More recently, the Supreme Court was provided another 
opportunity to put an end to acquitted conduct sentencing in Stroud v. 
United States,368 yet, it denied certiorari.369  Nevertheless, it granted 
certiorari on a narrower issue involving judge-found facts, which 
(1991). 
 362. Id. 
 363. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252.  See also Theodore Dalrymple, Trial by Human 
Beings: the Jury System and Its Discontents, NAT’L REV., Apr. 25, 2005, at 30.  
 364. ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 
13 (2012).   
 365. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 
1956).  See Amar, supra note 361, at 1186; Johnson, supra note 8, at 185.  
 366. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252 (quoting Letter from Juror #6 in United States v. Ball, 
to Hon. Richard W. Roberts, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (May 16, 2008)).  See 
McElhatton, supra note 27.  
 367. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252.  See DZUR, supra note 364, at 68–69.  
 368. United States v. Stroud, 673 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1581 
(2013). 
 369. Id. 
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increased the mandatory minimum, in Alleyne v. United States.370  
In Alleyne, the trial court imposed a seven-year sentence on a defendant 
for having “brandished” a firearm while “using or carrying [it] during 
and in relation to a crime of violence.”371  At trial, the jury had found 
only that the defendant used or carried the firearm, which carried a 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence.372  However, the judge, 
relying on Harris, found that the defendant had “brandished” the 
firearm, and thereby increased the defendant’s mandatory minimum 
sentence to seven years.373  The Supreme Court held that the 
defendant’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because the question of 
brandishing was never submitted to the jury.374  The Court’s opinion 
overruled Harris and explicitly held that there is no basis in principle 
or logic to distinguish facts that raise the statutory maximum, such as 
in Apprendi, from those that increase the statutory minimum.375  In 
other words, the Court clarified that Apprendi requires a jury to find all 
facts that fix the penalty range of a crime: the mandatory minimum is 
just as important to the statutory range as is the statutory maximum.376  
However, more importantly, the Court made clear that its holding 
was not designed to limit the discretion of the trial judge in imposing 
sentences within the range defined by the statutory maximum and 
mandatory minimum.  In fact, the Court reaffirmed that its ruling does 
not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found 
by a jury.377  Thus, the use of acquitted conduct under the relevant 
conduct provisions of the Guidelines remains entirely permissible, 
provided, however, that it does not increase the statutory maximum 
sentence or any applicable mandatory minimum sentence.378 
So, what happens when a Court seeks to punish defendants upon 
the insistence of prosecutors under the now advisory Guideline regime 
when a jury finds the proof wanting? Just as before, the same old story 
plays out.  While sentencing judges post-Booker and its progeny now 
have the discretion to disagree with the Guidelines, the starting point at 
sentencing is still to calculate the appropriate Guideline range under the 
 370. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156–64 (2013).  
 371. Id. at 2156. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 2163–64. 
 375. Id. at 2163. 
 376. See id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010). 
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“modified-real offense” approach to sentencing.379  Many sentencing 
judges now serving in the federal judiciary were appointed in the post-
Guideline era; all they have known is Guideline Sentencing.380  
Further, post-Booker era empirical research has shown that downward 
departures from the applicable Guideline range, in the absence of 
Government sponsored substantial assistance motions, still remains the 
exception, not the rule, in federal court.381  Fundamentally, the status 
quo has not noticeably changed.  This blind adherence to the 
Guidelines, what Judge Gertner terms as “anchoring,”382 continues to 
derogate “the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of 
criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence 
on every issue, which includes application of the laws to the facts.”383 
Why didn’t the Court go further?  As explained by Justice Breyer, 
the crucial fifth vote in Alleyne, the fiction . . . of the punishment 
enhancement distinction” provides the answer:384 
there is a traditional distinction between elements of a crime (facts 
constituting the crime typically for the jury to determine) and 
sentencing facts (facts affecting the sentence, often concerning, 
e.g., the manner in which the offender committed the crime, and 
typically for the judge to determine). 
. . . 
The early historical references that this Court’s opinions have set 
forth . . . refer to offense elements, not to sentencing facts.  Thus, 
when Justice Story wrote that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 
trial by jury offered ‘securit[y] against the prejudice of judges,’ he 
was likely referring to elements of a crime; and the best answer to 
Justice Scalia’s implicit question in Apprendi—what, exactly, does 
the ‘right to trial by jury’ guarantee?—is that it guarantees a jury’s 
 379. Lynn S. Adelman et al., Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines: 
Observations by District Judges, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (2006). 
 380. See, e.g., id. at 4, 12. 
 381. A Year After Booker: Most Sentences Still Within Guidelines, THIRD BRANCH (Feb. 
2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/06-02-
01/A_Year_After_Booker_Most_Sentences_Still_Within_Guidelines.aspx.  For statistics 
after the Supreme Court’s post Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, POST-KIMBROUGH/GALL 
DATA REPORT tbl. 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Kimbrough_Gall/U
SSC_Kimbrough_Gall_Report_Final_FY2008.pdf (noting a slight uptick from 12.2% to 
13.8% in non-government sponsored downward departures in sentencing). 
 382. Adelman, supra note 379, at 17.  
 383. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995). 
 384. See Brief for Appellate at 18, United States v. Johnson (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 08-
3033), 2014 WL 982870 at *18 (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2165–167 (Breyer, J., 
concurring)).  
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determination of facts that constitutes the elements of a crime.385 
In contrast, in a dissenting opinion in Oregon v. Ice,386 in which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter and Thomas joined, Justice 
Scalia emphasized that the right to jury trial guarantee, “turns upon the 
penal consequences attached to the fact, and not its formal definition as 
an element of the crime.”387  However, while the Ice dissent stirred up 
hope for a unique grouping of Justices to grant a writ of certiorari and 
decide the acquitted conduct sentencing issue,388 Stroud and Alleyne 
have proved that the time has not yet come. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrated that the practice of acquitted conduct 
sentencing under the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines 
cannot be justified by the two overarching theories of punishment: 
retributivism or utilitarianism.  Further, punishment for acquitted or 
uncharged conduct cannot be justified on the basis of bad character 
alone without upending the legitimacy of the criminal process.  There 
are increasing calls from numerous sentencing courts, appellate courts, 
and even Supreme Court justices echoing the academic commentary of 
the past two decades, urging the end of judicial consideration of 
acquitted conduct at sentencing within the relevant conduct provisions 
of the Sentencing Guidelines.389 
Fundamentally, acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the 
justifications for punishment by the state.  It impairs the substantive 
criminal law by weakening the foundational principle of the American 
criminal justice system.  It results in substantially longer sentences than 
would otherwise be warranted and accentuates inherent racial 
disparities under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Furthermore, it 
weakens the criminal burden of proof and law of evidence.  In addition, 
it attacks and weakens the jury as an institution by devaluing its role, 
function and purpose.  These observations not only lead to adverse 
empirical consequences for defendants, but they also reflect bad policy.  
Despite these complaints, the Supreme Court’s Stroud and Alleyne 
decisions demonstrate that it is far from ready to meaningfully limit 
 385. Id. (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2165–67 (Breyer, J., concurring)).  
 386. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).  For a detailed discussion see Doerr, supra 
note 264, at 247–49. 
 387. Ice, 555 U.S. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 388. Doerr, supra note 264, at 249. 
 389. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 13 (June 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_
Survey.pdf. 
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judicial fact-finding where it impacts the measure of penal 
consequences to a defendant, not just the “range” of penal sanctions, 
especially since it has underpinned more than three decades of its post-
SRA sentencing case law. 
However, more importantly, on a legislative and policy level, 
simply prohibiting the use of acquitted conduct under the relevant 
conduct provisions of the Guidelines without addressing the conflicting 
philosophies and rationales of punishment in the SRA would miss the 
wood for the trees.  After almost three decades of sentencing under the 
SRA, sentencing policy in the federal system is fragmented: there is no 
overarching model, theory, or rationale.390  Under both the previously 
mandatory and the current (advisory system) of Guideline sentencing, 
courts have struggled to reconcile the SRA with its mutually competing 
and conflicting goals with a defendant’s constitutional rights.  Thus, in 
the absence of an overriding theory or model of the purposes of 
punishment, with a primary rationale, the door would be left wide open 
for clever sentencing judges, anchored in decades of Guideline 
sentencing, to pick and choose from the § 3553(a) factors to return to 
the status quo ante. 
Judges are not “sentencing experts,”391 and relying on the 
individual whims of sentencing judges can serve to perpetuate and 
compound the problem and increase sentencing disparities.  Sentencing 
judges need guidance to structure their discretion when imposing 
sentence on a defendant.  The lack of clear direction on the purposes of 
punishment in the present system of plural aims, would not only 
continue the current “cafeteria” system392 of sentencing—permitting 
judges “a freedom to determine [penal] policy, rather than freedom to 
respond to an unusual combination of facts”393 and maintaining 
“sentencing anarchy,”394—but also give the system an unfortunate and 
illusory cloak of constitutionality.  Instead, since the Constitutional 
concerns are directly related to the purposes of punishment, the 
constitutional and normative concerns should be simultaneously 
addressed through an overarching aim for sentencing or a primary 
 390. Tonry, supra note 157, at 1. 
 391. Judge Gertner has written extensively on this issue.  See Gertner, supra note 61, at 
696; Gertner, supra note 317, at 421–22.  It is also important to note that most law schools 
in the United States do not even require a course in criminology or criminological theories 
as a part of the J.D. program. Rather it is a second year elective that most law students, in 
the rush to secure lucrative jobs, probably avoid.  
 392. GERALDINE MACKENZIE, HOW JUDGES SENTENCE 85 (2005) (citing ASHWORTH, 
supra note 275, at 63). 
 393. Id. (quoting ASHWORTH, supra note 275, at 63). 
 394. Id. (quoting Ashworth, supra note 276, at 350). 
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rationale or model that incorporates robust evidentiary and procedural 
protections for the defendant.  For instance, such reforms could include 
a prescription that “just deserts should be an overarching aim” or that 
“deterrent sentences” must be given to housebreakers, white collar 
offenders, or drug offenders, limited by the principle of parsimony, and 
requiring any relevant conduct evidence to be presented to the jury in a 
sentencing phase, or using special verdict forms at trial and structuring 
sentencers’ discretion and opportunity to circumvent the purposes of 
sentencing.395 
 
 395. MACKENZIE, supra note 392, at 85. 
 
